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Abstract 
In light of recent discussions of cognitive and ethical dilemmas related to International Relations 
(IR) scholarship, this paper proposes to engage the “problem of values” in IR as a composite 
question whose cognitive treatment requires the objectivation of the more profoundly institutional 
and social processes that subtend its emergence and evolution within the discipline. This analysis 
is hereby offered as an exercise in reflexive scholarship. Insofar as the question of values 
constitutes a defining cognitive and moral concern for reflexive knowledge itself, the paper also 
points to the need for its reformulation within an epistemic framework that is capable of moving 
beyond reflexivity to Reflexivism proper, understood as a systematic socio-cognitive practice of 
reflexivity.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
International Relations (IR) scholarship finds itself today in a situation that is reminiscent 
of the one in which Max Weber (2004[1918/1919]) found the German academy a century ago, 
with no clear standards for the definition of the scholar’s relationship to the public sphere, and of 
scholarship’s social and moral role∗. The International Studies Association’s (ISA) 2007 Annual 
Meeting, which called on the IR community to reflect on issues of “political involvement,” 
“scientific detachment,” “moral responsibility,” and “ethical standards” (Tickner and Tsygankov 
2008:661) is the institutional manifestation of this current state of affairs, which has recently 
been questioned or rejected by scholars promoting a more “reflexive” engagement with the 
commitments that underlie or result from IR’s objectivation of world politics (Smith 2002 and 
2004; Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Widmaier 2004; Tickner 2006; Lynch 2008; Ackerly and 
True 2008; Ish-Shalom 2008). “September 11” and the subsequent US “war on terror” have 
undoubtedly provided an extra-ordinary context and material for a critical reflexion on the 
discipline’s conceptual and practical relationship to its object of study, especially in light of the 
promotion of the Democratic-Peace thesis to the rank of official state ideology (Steele 2007; Ish-
Shalom 2008). The problems that the ISA organizers submitted to their colleagues’ consideration 
are, however, neither new, nor specific to IR.  
The status and role of values in knowledge have indeed constituted a central theme of 
Western epistemology and its defining principle of objectivity. Not only were they constitutive 
for the birth of the social sciences, but also repeatedly revisited with every new paradigmatic 
shift and social concern individually affecting them. IR has in this respect been no exception: the 
                                                       
∗ I would like to thank Michael C. Williams and the three referees who reviewed this paper, for their detailed and 
thoughtful comments, criticisms and suggestions. 
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“problem of values” is inscribed in most of its disciplinary debates, and the properly moral 
dilemmas that IR scholarship faces today have been equally – if not more violently – present in 
its disciplinary past. Some may dismiss them as marginal. For those of us who are convinced that 
these issues are central to both our cognitive endeavor and scholarly ethos as knowledge-
producers and social agents, it is legitimate to ask whether our treatment of these questions has 
led us anywhere closer to a satisfactory understanding and resolution of the problems and 
dilemmas they impose on us. “Dissident” IR scholarship has, after all, expressed itself in the past 
with great relevance and some degree of efficiency. Yet we find ourselves today struggling again 
with the same issues. To what extent, then, is the “Iraq War” different from the “Vietnam War” 
as a defining moment for IR scholarship, and why should we expect contemporary “dissidents” 
to be more successful than their predecessors in significantly altering IR’s intellectual and social 
practice? This paper posits that no significant progress can be made on these issues if we do not 
attempt to deconstruct the dominant culture of Positivism and its peculiar perspective on the 
“problem of values,” and to subsequently offer an alternative that is both cognitively more 
sound, and socially and morally more useful for the definition of our relationship to the social 
world.  
From this perspective, before actually attempting to answer the questions that were asked 
at the 2007 ISA Meeting, one needs first to ask how we got “here,” and what this “here” 
represents, cognitively and socio-historically, for IR. The process of deconstructing the “problem 
of values” therefore requires the adoption of a dual, reflexive methodology, whereby IR’s 
discourse on values is subjected to a meta-theoretical analysis that aims to make explicit its 
underlying epistemic premises, and to a sociological analysis that aims to identify the exogenous 
factors that have given such premises a measure of cognitive relevance. In other words, the terms 
of the debate over the fact/value dichotomy, the nature/status of values, norms, objectivity or 
value-freedom are premises that are hereby questioned not merely through the use of logic and 
philosophy, but through a socio-analysis that objectivates their social significance and origins. 
This paper, then, is guided by the idea that the way the “problem of values” has been framed, 
formulated, treated, or avoided in IR is the result of a complex socio-intellectual process rather 
than a purely rational one governed by logic and the rationale of science. “Why do we think the 
way we do today about values?” and “Why do we think of values as a problem?” thus become a 
legitimate starting point for a reflexive analysis. 
However, since the purpose of reflexive knowledge is also to permit the production of a 
more realistic and praxis-bearing understanding of how knowledge and reality are mutually 
constitutive (Guzzini 2000; 2005), and since the question of values is at the heart of the reflexive 
problématique (Hamati-Ataya 2010), such a reflexive viewpoint should also provide us with the 
means to alter cognitive and scholarly practice itself. The attempt to “institutionalise reflexivity” 
(Guillaume 2002:§ 33) should therefore be made. I suggest that this entails moving beyond 
reflexivity as a given conceptualization of the relationship between knowledge and reality, to 
Reflexivism proper, understood as a research program that is grounded in reflexivity and that 
presents itself as an alternative to Positivism. This paper therefore has two simultaneous 
objectives. On the one hand, the content of its two parts aims to achieve, respectively, a 
deconstruction of the “problem of values” in IR and then its reconstruction on the basis of an 
alternative cognitive and deontological perspective. On the other hand, its structure aims to make 
explicit the articulation of methodology and content, i.e., how a reflexive understanding of 
IR/politics can lead to a Reflexivist knowledge and praxis. 
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The first part of the paper, then, presents the “physiology” of the question of values in IR 
understood as a composite socio-intellectual one, whose cognitive, institutional, and social 
dimensions are dynamically intertwined in such a way that different stakes are involved and co-
related in IR discussions of the problem and of its alleged resolution, as well as in the 
discipline’s silence(s) about it. I start with the idea that the purely cognitive treatment of the 
“problem of values” is governed by the logical relationship among three questions pertaining 
respectively to the nature of (a knowledge of) values, the relationship between the factual and the 
normative, and the nature of objectivity understood as value-freedom. These questions are 
paradoxically both organically related to, and disjoined from, one another. Their disjunction has 
allowed a disciplinary shift from cognitive standards and concerns to socio-institutional ones.  
More specifically, I argue that with the emergence of the culture of Positivism within IR 
and its underlying institutional and social interests, the question of how values can, given their 
proper nature, be studied has been progressively and implicitly replaced with how, given the 
nature of science, they could be excluded. This intellectual displacement of the terms of the 
debate corresponds to “value-freedom” being given precedence, and sometimes even exclusive 
attention, over the other two cognitive concerns. This Positivist moment has consequently 
operated, or at least allowed, another significant shift from an original concern with the relation 
of academic to public discourse, to a general disengagement from scholarship’s moral role. I then 
argue that this has by and large been sustained, to date, by a disciplinary consensus over the 
purpose of theory, with the transformation of the analytical distinction between “problem-
solving” and “critical” or “reflective theory” into a properly institutional one, whereby different 
communities of IR scholars co-exist in such a way that the problem of values ceases to embody a 
universal philosophical, epistemic and moral issue, and becomes restricted to the research 
questions and concerns generated exclusively by a specific type of IR, namely the “critical,” 
“reflective” type.  
In light of this analysis, the second part of the paper aims to reformulate the question of 
values precisely as a composite one whose treatment necessitates the production of a discourse 
that is capable of acknowledging the relationship between cognitive, institutional and social 
processes, and of objectivating this relationship within a single theoretical frame of reference. I 
suggest that such an endeavor can be achieved within a Reflexivist IR, where Reflexivism is 
defined as a systematic socio-cognitive practice of reflexivity, and reflexivity as the scholar’s 
conceptual/methodological response to her acknowledgment of the mutual reflectivity of 
knowledge and reality, i.e., of the inscription of social divisions, interests and concerns in 
cognitive categories of understanding and analysis, and vice versa.  
Because it is itself grounded in a commitment to reflexivity as a requirement and 
prerequisite of IR scholarship, the second part of the paper departs from the second-order 
analysis of the first part, and establishes itself firmly in a non-foundationalist epistemic position 
that aims to reverse the cognitive and ethical tenets of Positivism. At the cognitive level, 
Reflexivism frames the question of values independently of the dichotomies and problématique 
Positivism has imposed on scholarship for decades, by identifying the importance of 
acknowledging and exploring the relationship between “being” and the historical potentialities 
that it can generate, and that between knowledge and judgment/praxis. This enables Reflexivism 
to engage the ethical/social dimension of knowledge by reversing the Positivist deontology of 
value-freedom, while transcending the Weberian ideal-typical approach to scholarly ethos. 
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EMBRACING THE PROBLEM OF VALUES IN IR: 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF A COMPOSITE SOCIO-INTELLECTUAL QUESTION  
 
The history and sociology of science have de-sacralized the standards and beliefs that 
govern the activity of scientists as individuals and as organized communities, including the 
notions of “truth” and “objectivity,” by revealing the social and ideological mechanisms and 
stakes that underlie scientific debates and the emergence or disappearance of concepts, theories, 
and forms of knowledge throughout history. All debates pertaining to the nature and criteria of 
scientific objectivity, such as the “problem of values,” can be approached from a sociological 
perspective, in order to identify the particular structures and processes (material and ideational) 
that subtend them, and that contribute to the social/institutional fixation of the criteria and 
categories that define and guarantee their intellectual legitimacy (Bourdieu 1984 and 
1998[1992]). A deconstruction of the “problem of values” in IR should therefore attempt to 
reconstruct the link between cognitive consensus and socio-historical constraints. 
 
Where we stand today: 
IR scholarship’s moral dilemma 
 
The moral dilemmas that IR faces today are empirically revealed by its scholars’ attitude 
toward the public sphere. The positions currently taken by IR scholars not only signify the 
antagonisms that exist within the discipline, but also point to the importance of IR’s socio-
political context in shaping its scholarly discourse on the relation of knowledge to values. Two 
particular positions are worth noting here, because they represent two ideal-typically different 
reactions, but can also simultaneously be viewed as the two sides of a single coin. 
  The first position is exemplified in a statement published in the New York Times in 
September 2002 by a group of 33 IR scholars (Art et al. 2002), in which they express their 
opposition to the impending US-led military operation against Iraq – an early manifestation of 
what, four years later, is the silently shared view of 76% of American IR scholars (Maliniak et 
al. 2006). Based on a strict rationalization of US “national interest” in light of the lack of 
“material” evidence justifying the operation and the equally “material” negative consequences 
for the US that said operation would lead to, the statement can be read as a minimalist, realist 
“policy science” utterance (Hoffmann 1960:10). In this short text, the signees have implicitly but 
clearly revealed a great part of their scholarly ethos and their position vis-à-vis their object of 
study: the statement indeed reveals that what their intellectual stand targets is only the most 
factual, material manifestations of politics. The statement does not touch upon the 
axiological/normative principles that underlie US foreign policy, such as the hidden justifications 
for the “war,” nor its moral aspects or consequences. In other words, it is clearly governed by a 
double non-dit or unspoken principle, namely, that academic discourse is limited to addressing a 
certain aspect of reality, and that its intervention in the public sphere is acceptable/legitimate 
insofar as it respects the rules of  “neutrality” that are defined by this limitation. 
The second position is exemplified in Steve Smith’s 2003 Presidential Address to the 
ISA, powerfully entitled “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and 
September 11” (Smith 2004). Written “on the eve of a probable war against Iraq” and published 
after its launch, the paper aims to “raise explicitly the relationship between academic study and 
ethics”. More specifically, it claims “that the discipline of International Relations is complicit in 
the constitution of this world of international relations,” that “there can be no such thing as a 
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value-free, non-normative social science” and that “the ways in which the discipline […] 
constructs the categories of thought within which we explain the world, helps to reinforce 
Western, predominantly U.S., practices of statecraft that themselves reflect an underlying set of 
social forces”. This, the author admits, “is unavoidably an ethical issue, and to be clear from the 
outset I do not see any possibility (or desirability) of separating ethics from academic study” 
(Smith 2004:498-500). 
These two texts are manifestations of two different academic positions, as well as the 
joint expression of the deep divide that currently structures IR scholarship with respect to how it 
conceives of the nature of its intellectual and social practice, and the terms of its social and moral 
dilemmas. They can, however, simultaneously be viewed as the manifestation of the same 
phenomenon, namely, the present state of a discipline that “ha[s] ignored, to its cost, ethical 
questions in the pursuit of value-neutral explanations” (Smith 2004:513). Smith’s reflexive 
attempt to deal with this state of affair, in the form of a collective mea culpa that calls for a 
revision of the discipline’s central cognitive tenets, is merely the mirror image of the 33 IR 
scholars’ self-restrained public manifesto. The question, then, is how did we get to this point? 
How did we get “here”? Surely, IR scholarship did not “ignore ethical questions” because of 
some cognitive necessity or some intrinsic impossibility of addressing them theoretically. I 
would like to argue, rather, that this situation has its roots in the rise in importance of a properly 
social concern that played a determining role in segregating the question of value-freedom, 
understood as the corollary of scientific objectivity, from the full problematization of the 
question of values.  
 
From value-freedom to moral disengagement: 
The social embeddedness of the cognitive debate on values 
 
The problem of value-freedom, value-neutrality or ethical neutrality (and these 
terminological differences are important – see below), is intimately related to two other complex 
problems. The first one pertains to the nature of values (often conceptualized as different from 
“facts”) and therefore to the possibility of producing an objective knowledge of them (as 
opposed to “value-judgments”). This is one of the oldest and most recurrent themes of 
philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of knowledge, and the opposite epistemic positions of 
value-cognitivism and value-non-cognitivism each have their proponents in this endless debate 
(see Hobbes 1994[1651]; Durkheim 1953[1911] and 1966[1895]; Weber 1949a[1917] and 
1949b[1904]; Brecht 1959; Taylor 1967; Oppenheim 1973). The second problem pertains to the 
relationship between the factual/descriptive and the normative/prescriptive, and therefore to the 
differences and relationship between scientific and ideological discourse, and more generally 
between science and politics/ethics. Often framed in terms of the dichotomy between what is and 
what ought to be, this second problem touches upon epistemological, deontological and moral 
issues alike (see Hume 2003[1739-40] and 1983[1751]; Comte (1880); Marx and Engels 
1978[1845]; Durkheim 1966[1895]; Weber 1949a[1917]; 1949b[1904] and 2004[1918/1919]; 
Hare 2003[1952]; Searle 1969; Mackie 1977). I distinguish these different questions in order to 
highlight the following, important paradox: that they are organically related to, but also disjoined 
from, one another.  
They are organically related in the sense that the way wherein one problematizes and 
answers one of them will logically affect, and possibly determine, how the others are 
problematized and answered. For example, a philosophy of knowledge that considers that values 
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cannot be objectively known (value-non-cognitivism) may consequently consider that the 
discovery of facts cannot further our understanding of norms, and that science can therefore not 
shape policy; this may lead to an ethos of moral neutrality whereby the scholar, by 
acknowledging her lack of competence over axiological and normative issues, will refrain from 
dealing with all types of values and norms altogether. On the other hand, a philosophy of 
knowledge that considers that an objective knowledge of values is possible (value-cognitivism) 
may consequently consider that social science is capable of revealing causal relations between 
given social structures and the achievement of given political norms; this, in turn, would allow 
the scholar to position herself within an activist perspective wherein her discourse is made 
relevant to public debates and policies, and therefore enable her to actually express preferences 
for given social norms. There are of course too many possible variations to discuss them all here, 
but it is worth noting three things. Firstly, that the consistency of a given theoretical position 
with respect to the “problem of values” can be assessed in light of the logical consistency among 
the answers to these three questionsi; secondly, that any attempt by IR scholarship to rigorously 
and systematically address the question of value-freedom will necessarily require it to address 
the other two problems as well; finally, that the very terms in which these questions have been 
posed – and their answers formulated – in Western philosophy are grounded in a particular 
premise that often enjoys the status of a universal a priori, namely, the “fact-value dichotomy”.  
Paradoxically, these three questions are also disjoined in the sense that they can 
individually be made relevant to different and independent practical concerns. This is already 
suggested in the fact that despite their organic relationship, there is no necessary intellectual 
requirement as to which question should be addressed first, and the scholar may just as well be 
motivated by epistemic choices that subsequently produce ontological and methodological ones, 
as she can be motivated primarily by practical methodological or empirical concerns that will 
determine the extent to which she will need to bother about epistemic, ontological or ethical 
consistency. Within the predominant empiricist IR scholarship, it is not even certain that these 
issues will be given any significant importance at all. If they are nonetheless considered, which 
question will be addressed first, or perhaps even exclusively, may also often be determined by 
non-cognitive concerns or commitments. For example, Smith’s recent (2002; 2004) primary 
preoccupation with “value-neutrality,” rather than the ontological status of values or the 
epistemological debate over the nature of objective knowledge, is directly motivated by a 
social/moral concern that was triggered by a specific historical situationii. The social, 
ideological, or properly ethical considerations that motivate or orient scholarship are therefore 
likely to influence theoretical commitments and choices at least as much as the requirements of 
theoretical consistency. 
Regardless, then, of the logical constraints that govern any comprehensive treatment of 
the problem of values, the actual historical treatment of this problem, in most of 
Western/American political and international theory, has been partial in the sense that the 
question of value-freedom has constituted both a disproportionately important concern and a 
disproportionately important standard for theoretical and empirical production. This 
phenomenon is clearly illustrated, in the case of American scholarship, in the significant 
transformation of the Weberian intellectual position and the ethos it defines. Weber’s analysis – 
one of the most consistent treatments of the problem of values – was adopted by American social 
scientists in the early days of the establishment of American political theory (Gunnell 1993; 
2006). It has, however, undergone a serious transformation with the emergence of the Behavioral 
Revolution and the culture of Positivism, whose impact on IR are still felt today. 
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Weber used the term Wertfreiheit to refer to the requirement that the scholar 
keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the “value-
oriented” conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own 
practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
(including among these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are the 
objects of investigation) (Weber 1949a[1917]:11; emphasis in original).  
 
Most of the tenets of Weber’s Verstehen (or “interpretive”) sociology are included in this 
statement. The two parenthetical propositions refer to Weber’s ontological position, which 
considers that values underlie human conduct, and that they constitute the social scientist’s 
object of study. That he views them as “included” in “empirical facts” means that although he 
utilizes the analytical distinction between “facts” and “values” (rather than the fact/value 
dichotomy), he does not consider that this distinction is sufficient to exclude values from the 
inquiry of social science, and that values can and should be objectivated as particular types of 
facts. The reason why the “establishment of empirical facts” should be “kept unconditionally 
separate” from value-judgments is that “to judge the validity of […] values is a matter of faith,” 
and the adherence to given “ultimate standards is [a] personal affair” that “involves will and 
conscience, not empirical knowledge” (1949b[1904]:55, 54). “Ultimate standards” or norms can 
therefore not be logically deduced from factual knowledge. The resulting dichotomy between 
empirical and normative discourse provides the foundation for sociology as a science concerned 
with the “analysis of facts” and the discovery of objective causal relations, a science incapable of 
supporting the axiological claims of social agents. While sociology can study human valuations 
empirically, it cannot, however, prove that some valuations are superior to others, and can 
therefore provide no guidance for the establishment of socio-political norms, because “the 
validity of a practical imperative as a norm and the truth-value of an empirical proposition are 
absolutely heterogeneous in character” (Weber 1949a[1917]:12). Consequently, the “analysis of 
facts” cannot lead to “statements of ideals,” which is the proper realm of social policy (Weber 
1949b[1904]:60).  
This logical dichotomy, in turn, produces another, deontological one that segregates the 
realm and ethos of “scientific man” from those of “political man” (Weber 2004[1918/1919]). 
From the Weberian perspective, scientific knowledge produces a rational, not an axiological 
obligation, since “strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution only where it 
is a question of means adequate to the realization of an absolutely unambiguous end” 
(1949a[1917]:26). By revealing the causal relations that account for social phenomena, science 
implicitly delimits the realm of rational action in a hypothetical, not categorical manner. In this 
sense, “it cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather what he can do” (1949b[1904]:54) 
without, however, guaranteeing that he will, for the laws of human behavior, unlike those of 
nature, are ultimately governed by freedom. Wertfreiheit, then, means that the scholar should 
remain “free from” the preferences and objectives of political agents, and be exclusively guided 
by her own ethos, which guarantees, if not that political agents will listen to her, at least that her 
social role is endowed with enough legitimacy for her to maintain an independence from the 
agenda of political agents, as well as the possibility of confronting their policies with an 
autonomous knowledge whose standards are independent of individual and social preferences 
and interests. Weberian value-freedom, then, essentially implies an ethos of social responsibility, 
rather than one of detachment or disengagement.  
 8 
Weber’s problematization of the question of values is itself embedded in a socio-
historical singularity, that of the German academy’s relationship to the public and political 
spheres in a specific moment of its history. Although this socio-historical embeddedness 
constitutes an important boundary condition for the relevance of his analysis to other socio-
historical contexts, it has gained significance in American scholarship precisely because of the 
similarities of the socio-intellectual dilemmas that American political scientists were faced with 
during the constitutive period of American social sciences, as well as the parametric role the 
German model played in the establishment of American Political Science (Gunnell 1993; Somit 
and Tanenhaus 1967). However, with the evolution of the American academy and of its 
underlying institutional and social concerns, the cognitive rationale and ethos of the Weberian 
position have been significantly transformed. The concern for value-freedom has become more 
intimately tied to the social legitimacy and credibility of the social sciences than to a properly 
cognitive and ethical investigation. With science being allocated an increased social value in 
Western societies (especially in the US), the principles of objectivity, rationality, and scientific 
rigor have become increasingly instrumental in shaping the social sciences and their social 
agenda. This led to value-freedom being understood as a methodological standard that could be 
achieved through techniques of value-control, independently of an investigation of their meaning 
in orienting the scholar’s research and epistemic choices. The purpose became to pursue 
“objectively controlled inquiry” (Nagel 1979[1961]:486-7) by guaranteeing that values are not 
allowed “a role that insulates them from the test of experience” (Abraham Kaplan, quoted in 
Greene 1970:289)iii. The more problematic aspects of scholarship’s relation to values have 
consequently been “prudently tabled in the interest of getting on with empirical research” 
(Searing 1970:71). 
This shift from cognitive to praxeological concerns is manifested in one of the founding 
texts of American Behavioralism, David Easton’s The Political System. Easton (1953:221) 
characteristically utilizes the Weberian epistemic stance, when he declares that   
 
[a]lthough in practice no one proposition need express either a pure fact or a pure value, 
facts and values are logically heterogeneous. The factual aspect of a proposition refers to 
a part of reality; hence it can be tested by reference to facts. In this way we check its 
truth. The moral aspect of a proposition, however, expresses only the emotional response 
of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts. It indicates whether and the extent to 
which an individual desires a particular state of affairs to exist. Although we can say that 
the aspect of a proposition referring to a fact can be true or false, it is meaningless to 
characterize the value aspect of a proposition in this way. (emphasis added) 
 
However, Easton’s position is now inscribed in a different rationale, and in a different socio-
historical and institutional moment. With Behavioralism, the priority is no longer so much to 
defend value-freedom in order to prevent the collusion with power and maintain the type of 
intellectual independence that would allow the practice of an ethos of social responsibility, but to 
herald it as the corollary of the type of scientific objectivity that is equated with “rigor” and 
“efficiency” (Eulau 1969; McCoy and Playford 1967). For Easton, the “malaise” in which 
American Political Science finds itself in the 1950s results not from the social and moral 
dilemmas that accompany its students’ proximity to their object of study, but from their lack of 
understanding of science, and lack of will in the acquisition of the scientific attitude that other 
scholars have successfully adhered to and internalized, especially economists. This signifies the 
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extent to which the intellectual mood had changed since the institution of American Political 
Science, which was now more concerned with establishing a clear break with its philosophical 
legacy and its corresponding ethical tradition of inquiry. As Charles Taylor (1967:25) put it, 
 
[t]he view was indeed that political science has come of age in freeing itself finally of the 
incubus of political philosophy. No more would its scope be narrowed and its work 
prejudiced by some value position which operated as an initial weight holding back the 
whole enterprise.  
 
This mood prevailed in (American) IR at the same time, as recorded in the literature of 
the heated “second debate” between those who labeled themselves the “scientists” and those they 
labeled the “traditionalists” (see Knorr and Rosenau 1972[1969])iv. The terminology of this 
debate points to the institutional and social stakes that were involved in what many 
commentators consider to be a purely epistemological or methodological discussion. This is first 
visible in the very discursive strategies used by the proponents of the “scientific” approach to de-
legitimize the forms of scholarship embodied by their opponents (as revealed by the accusation 
of “traditionalism”), by rejecting them outside of “objective” knowledge, either in the margins of 
the field, or properly without it, which usually meant somewhere in Philosophy or History. What 
appears to be a fundamentally intellectual divide (as manifested in the debate over explaining vs. 
understanding) can also be viewed as the rationalized, probably unconscious competition 
between different forms of intellectual and academic capital, with the emergence of a new 
generation of scholars endowed with a type of knowledge that is relevant to a more quantitative 
approach to social reality, and its correlated skills, such as Mathematics and computer modeling.  
More importantly, the debate was subtended by exogenous stakes resulting from the 
newfound and rewarding interest of the political field for the increasingly scientific and reliable 
science of politics/IR. This imposed social and institutional constraints on the new generation of 
scholars, bound by the logic of public and private funding and support to engage in the newly 
legitimized approach to social facts (Jackson and Sørensen 2003[1999]:45), sometimes resulting 
in odd “conversions” among previous opponents to Positivism. Significantly, the adoption of the 
term “behavioral science” by a group of scholars from the University of Chicago was itself 
motivated by the fear that a confusion between “social science” and “socialism” would dissuade 
federal institutions from allocating them funds (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967:182-183).  
The socio-historical underpinnings of this intellectual debate are further manifested in the 
fact that the culture of Positivism was strongly opposed by a different social group characterized 
by a different habitus (see Bourdieu 1980): a group of European émigrés including Hans 
Morgenthau, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Erik Voegelin and Herbert Marcuse, who shared a 
sensitivity for the intellectual’s social role (Gunnell 2006), which became an important 
existential issue in light of 20th-century Europe’s political experience. Among these scholars, 
pessimism and caution with regards to value-freedom and benevolent social engineering were 
accompanied by a constant reminder of the need for political and international theory to preserve 
its role of judge of power (Morgenthau 1946; 1958; 1970) and its corresponding engaged ethos 
of citizenship (Strauss 1969). However, the alignment of public and academic interests and 
conceptions regarding the nature and social role of political science (see Oren 2002; 2004) were 
instrumental in shaping the social boundaries of authorized or acceptable scholarship: when (the 
Weberian) Morgenthau (1965) mobilized his understanding of power politics to condemn 
American foreign policy in Vietnam, he found himself isolated from both the field’s mainstream 
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scholarship and the circles of power, which were increasingly irritated by his intrusive voice 
(Glaser Rafshoon 2001). Weber’s idea that “only if science was distinct from politics, with 
separate standards of validity, could it speak with authority to politics and constitute a critical 
voice” was being successfully replaced with social and moral “disengagement”: by the 1960s, 
“most behavioral political scientists had largely ceased to discuss the relationship between public 
and academic discourse” (Gunnell 1993: 149, 223). 
The main consequence, then, of the emergence of the culture of Positivism (and 
scientism) in American IR, is an analytical confusion between “value-freedom” (i.e., cognitive 
objectivity/impartiality) and “ethical neutrality” (i.e., moral disengagement/indifference). 
Significantly enough, Weber’s Wertfreiheit, which denotes a freedom from “what is endowed 
with value” (literally, worth), and which is often used in German as synonymous with 
Werturteilsfreiheit (freedom from value-judgments)v is actually translated as “ethical neutrality,” 
rather than “value-freedom” (see Weber 1949a[1917] and 1949b[1904]); the interchangeability 
of the two terms in the English-speaking literature of the field is itself representative of this 
implicit displacement. “Ethical neutrality” implies that the problématique of values concerns 
moral values, and consequently that the neutrality of the scholar is one vis-à-vis morality. This 
suggests the extent to which the adherence to a Positivist view of objectivity would logically 
entail an ethos of moral disengagement. In French, however, a significant distinction between 
“neutralité axiologique” (value-neutrality) and “neutralité éthique” (ethical neutrality) allows 
for a distinction between cognitive objectivity and moral neutrality, which are thereby not 
viewed as mutually inclusive. This also allows for the investigation of the problem of values as a 
particular case, rather than a corollary, of the problem of “epistemic and methodological 
neutrality” (see Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1983[1968]:61-71). But in most Western 
(American) political and international theory, “value-freedom,” “value-neutrality” and “ethical 
neutrality” have become synonymous, elliptical expressions, generically referring to a negative 
attitude toward everything axiological, with no particular need to specify what scholarship is 
actually supposed to be “free(d) from”. The important nuances have in effect been lost in the 
literature. 
The adherence to a notion of “value-freedom” understood as both synonymous with 
objectivity and a (sufficient) guarantee of objectivity has thereby led to a generally accepted and 
consensual stance whereby values as both objects of study and as constitutive variables in the 
production of knowledge are largely disregarded. The Behavioral Revolution has thus 
successfully turned a social division (scientists vs. non-scientists) into an analytical dichotomy 
(value-neutrality vs. moral engagement). As I wish to argue next, this situation has been further 
reinforced in IR, despite renewed opposition to it, by a second socio-intellectual process 
involving the question of theory’s “purpose”. 
 
Keeping dissidence at the margins:  
The institutionalization of analytical divisions 
 
The displacement of the question of values and its reduction to a positivist standard of 
value-control have not gone unchallenged in social, political and IR theory, even during the 
Behavioral Revolution. Some critics saw in the Behavioralist’s effort to become a “pure 
scientist” merely “a device for avoiding politics without achieving science” (Alfred Cobban, 
quoted in Hoffmann 1960:40-1). Others viewed the scientific approach as simply dangerous. 
Hedley Bull (1972[1966]), who saw the new trend as a specifically American one, warned that 
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“by cutting [itself] off from history and philosophy” political and IR theory had “deprived [itself] 
of the means of self-criticism”. Even Easton (1969) proposed, two decades after his original call 
for a scientific approach, to acknowledge the need for moral evaluation and for a new, “post-
behavioralist revolution”. This was merely an adjustment to a more profound division within the 
American academy. Behavioralism had in fact led to the rise of an internal dissidence that called 
for a reform of the social sciences’ methodologies and underlying ethos. Militant associations 
emerged, such as the Radical Caucus in Sociology and the Sociology Liberation Movement (see 
Nicolaus 1968; 1969), the Union for Radical Political Economists, and the Caucus for a New 
Political Science (CNPS). The CNPS, which “was formed in 1967 to challenge the complacency 
of American political science, its conservatism, its government links and, above all, […] the 
‘irrelevance’ of the discipline,” was particularly suspicious of the positivist ethos of value-
neutrality and the general “sciencizing” of the field, which it viewed as “politics by other means” 
(Surkin and Wolfe 1970:3, 4). As Marvin Surkin (1970:14) put it, 
 
the rigorous adherence to social science methodology adopted from the natural sciences 
and its claim to objectivity and value neutrality function as a guise for what is in fact 
becoming an increasingly ideological, nonobjective role for social science knowledge in 
the service of the dominant institutions in American society. 
 
 It is unlikely that IR was oblivious to such social oppositions. Within its own ranks, 
however, the problem seems to have successfully been contained within a strictly intellectual 
setting. A wider and more systematic sociological investigation of the development of IR in the 
1970s is needed to explain its immunity against such permeating events, but it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the institutional concern for the preservation of the discipline and of its 
autonomy have contributed to postponing the (marginal) impact of the anti-positivist critique to 
the 1980s. The revival of its founding paradigm – Realism – in the form of a structural, positivist 
approach to world politics, is in this respect both strange and extra-ordinary in its success, since 
it managed to “lock up the discipline again” (Guzzini 2000: 156). Neorealism succeeded indeed 
in its disciplinary ambition of immunizing the old founding paradigm against the diversification 
of its subject-matter, and against the increasingly diffused and versatile definition of power that 
resulted from the inter-disciplinary research programs of Behavioralism and from the emergence 
of economic and cultural approaches to international relations (Brown 2005[2001]:33; Viotti and 
Kauppi 1987:562; Guzzini 2002[1998]:108). The properly institutional concern for disciplinary 
autonomy has therefore constituted an important factor in further isolating (scientific) IR from 
the other social sciences, and hence from the more philosophical, normative, historical and 
sociological approaches to world politics.  
In light of this general institutional setting, an important process should be considered, 
which has operated a shift in the opposite direction than the one operated by the Behavioral 
Revolution, by transforming an analytical division into a socio-institutional one. This analytical 
division, which has informed IR discussions of the purpose of theory, is that between “short-run” 
“problem-solving theory” and “long-run” “critical theory” (Widmaier 2004:428), which has been 
turned into a properly institutional and intellectual dichotomy, thereby efficiently leading to the 
neutralization of the most challenging and de-legitimizing critiques of the latter against the 
former.  
An early example of the problematization of theory’s purpose is found in Stanley 
Hoffmann (1960:8), who distinguished among “normative” or “value” theory, “empirical” or 
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“causal” theory, and “policy science”. This “analytical” classification was proposed to highlight 
the many layers of purpose involved in the objectivation of politics – respectively, philosophical 
inquiry, theoretical explanation, and social change – with the complementary warning that the 
actual segregation of purely scientific theory from normative theory should be avoided 
(1960:173-4). The rise of anti-positivism in IR further contributed to bringing these differences 
to the forefront of scholarly debates. IR’s “third debate” (Lapid 1989) has in fact helped 
institutionalize these differences in the form of a dichotomy between “problem-solving theory,” 
associated with Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Rational Choice Theory, and “critical theory,” 
associated with post-positivist approaches such as Neomarxism and Critical Theory (the 
Frankfurt School), Normative Theory, and later on Poststructuralism and Constructivism (all of 
which have been collapsed by Robert Keohane (1988) into “reflective theory”). Robert Cox 
(1996[1981]:88) set the tone of the debate when he declared that 
 
theory can serve two distinct purposes. One is a simple, direct response: to be a guide to 
help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was 
the point of departure. The other is more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: 
to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation 
to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the 
possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes 
one of creating an alternative world. Each of these purposes gives rise to a different kind 
of theory. The first purpose gives rise to problem-solving theory. […] The second 
purpose leads to critical theory. (italics in original; emphasis added in bold). 
 
By presenting themselves as offering a different, i.e., complementary type of knowledge, 
“critical,” “reflective” IR scholars actually provided their opponents with the best institutional 
strategy for neutralizing their impact on the field, by democratically accepting them at most as a 
marginal, tolerable opposition to mainstream IR. The most successful strategic use of the 
criterion of purpose is revealed in Kenneth Waltz’s reply to (or rather, ignorance of) Richard 
Ashley’s criticisms. Ashley (1986:262-263) points to the “scientifically inscrutable ideological 
connotations” that are hidden by Neorealism’s positivistic, allegedly neutral assessment of 
reality. By transforming science into a “purely technical enterprise,” Neorealism produces “an 
ideology that anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the 
rationalization of global politics”. Waltz’s response to Ashley is a textbook case of rhetorical 
denigration, summed up by Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling (2004:27, ft. 11) in an 
adequate “Hunh??”: declaring his opponent to be incomprehensible, Waltz finds his way out of 
Ashley’s “maze” in a rejection of the latter’s criticism altogether as simply irrelevant. Drawing 
on the purpose of theory as a standard for explanation, Waltz thus considers that “critical 
theory,” which “seeks to interpret the world historically and philosophically,” is a completely 
different endeavor than “problem-solving theory,” which “seeks to understand [the world] and 
explain it”. More importantly, the former type of theorizing provides “no clue about how to write 
an improved theory of the latter sort” (Waltz 1986:341). Insofar as Waltz, like other Positivists, 
is interested in explaining rather than understanding world politics, the epistemic distinction that 
is thus set as a standard of cognitive rigor provides the framework that keeps hermetically 
separated the realm of facts from that of values, thereby combining the “moral non-cognitivism” 
of Positivist empiricism to its “instrumentalist” approach to world politics (Spegele 1996:7). As 
Robert Crawford (2000:150) notes, “in declaring [his] failure to understand [Ashley],” Waltz 
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“appear[s] to make a conscious symbolic declaration about what can, and cannot, be said to 
count as a contribution to IR theory”. This is such a successful disciplinary strategy that “not 
taking Ashley seriously has become a bit of an industry in its own right” (Crawford 2000:151). 
Waltz’s response reveals the practical usefulness of the consensus on purpose for 
immunizing theory from any accusation of, or reflexion on, ideology, and more generally from 
the “problem of values,” however it may be defined – for, in this line of argument, it does not 
need to be defined at all, since it can simply be evaded. The focus on the purpose of theory as a 
demarcation criterion has thus served to blur – and practically annihilate – the question of values 
in its epistemic and ontological dimensions, and consequently, to relegate it to the margin of the 
field. In other words, the consensus over the idea that the question of values is problematic only 
if one is interested in it has contributed to postponing its treatment as a legitimate cognitive and 
practical problem of international theory. Since the end of the 1980s, “critical,” “reflective” 
theory has indeed managed to coexist with mainstream IR, but merely in the form of a 
marginalized, self-appointed “dissident” scholarship, “speak[ing] from the margins” (Ashley and 
Walker 1990b:367) in “the language of exile,” and claiming an “extraterritorial,” “politicized 
non-place” from which it attempts to “think other-wise” in “a way that makes possible the 
testing of limitations and the exploration of excluded possibilities” (Ashley and Walker 
1990a:263; emphasis in original). Mainstream IR has acknowledged its presence and tolerated its 
claim to usefulness, while at the same time questioning its paradigmatic and empirical potential 
(Keohane 1988) and the extent of its “belonging” to the field, thereby actually “excluding” it as a 
“possibility”:  
 
[critical IR] leads to a dead end, or perhaps more accurately, to a new road with a 
destination that bears little or no resemblance to international politics…along this route 
we learn a great deal about the innumerably contested ways of how to think about a 
subject matter, but almost nothing about the subject itself. (K.J. Holsti, quoted in 
Crawford 2000:153; emphasis in original) 
 
By shifting the problématique of “critical theory” from an epistemic to a practical one, 
the focus on purpose has, then, managed to transform the demarcation between “problem-
solving” and “critical” theory into a social one, separating two different communities of scholars 
who can coexist democratically as long as they do not attempt to question one another’s validity 
and hence legitimacy. With this arrangement, “problem-solving” theorists can simply 
“outsource” the question of values to “critical theorists”, with no reflexive effect on their own 
theoretical or empirical production. As Pierre Bourdieu (2004[2001]) notes with respect to other 
epistemic dichotomies in social science, the relationship between epistemic and social divisions 
is often veiled, and academic debates often serve to hide it even more, thereby immunizing it 
from the (reflexive) gaze of the socio-analyst. It is, then, not surprising that some consider 
Positivism to have “produc[ed] a discipline that is marked by political assumptions 
masquerading as technical ones” (Smith 2004:503), hiding or permitting, behind conceptual 
notions of purpose, ideological and political interests and implications, and behind the 
commitment to value-freedom, a real “value-commitment” to a scientistic notion of “progress” 
(Jackson 2008:138).  
 The institutional and social division of the field along this demarcation line is manifested 
in the social organization of the discipline itself. It has become a commonplace today to say that 
IR is both a “divided” and “dividing” discipline (Holsti 1985), with a centre of production still 
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solidly rooted in the Positivist, empiricist culture of the American academy (Hoffmann 1977; 
Crawford and Jarvis 2001) and its “hegemonic” status within international IR (Holsti 1985; 
Smith 2002). The marginalization of “critical,” “reflective theory” is also visible in the field’s 
curriculum and its lack of inter-disciplinarity, in the segregation of its scholars’ research interests 
in the different sections of the ISA and the American Political Science Association, in the 
editorial policies of its academic journals (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998; Waever 
1998), and its funding, recruitment, promotion and tenure policies (Smith 2002:72; 
Agathangelou and Ling 2004). With the social value of Science being unchanged in Western 
societies, IR scholars are not particularly encouraged to present themselves as anything else than 
“scientists,” and are still marginalized and undermined if they “market” themselves otherwise 
(Smith 2004). The “prescription for a rigorous philosophy-avoidance strategy for the practicing 
social scientist” (Lapid 1989:235) has therefore shaped IR scholars’ habitus in important ways, 
by shaping not only their practice, but also their cognitive and social dispositions as knowledge-
producers (see Bourdieu 1980). 
 The social-institutional division between mainstream scholars and the “dissidents” of the 
1980s and 1990s seems, however, to have somewhat shifted in American IR. A recent survey 
that attempts to identify the lines of fracture in the field (Hamati-Ataya forthcoming 2011b) 
points to the institutionalization of the older generation of “dissidents” (who nonetheless still 
identify themselves as such), and the emergence of a new generation of scholars whose cognitive 
commitments are more diffusely but more antagonistically opposed to contemporary 
“mainstream” American IR scholarship than their predecessors’ were. The older divisions are 
still visible, with the concentration of the great majority of American IR within the research 
concerns of “positivism,” “rationalism,” and “materialism,” and the remaining part of the field 
constituted by a loose, heterogenous group of scholars more directly concerned with values, 
identity, language and knowledge as central to IR’s subject-matter, and committed to a more 
“anti-positivist,” “constitutive,” “sociological” approach to world politics. The lower 
institutional status of this new generation of scholars, in opposition to both that of 
“mainstreamers” and of the now-tenured “dissidents” of the 1980s, points to the fragile situation 
of the new “anti-mainstream” American IR scholarship, to the marginalization of its research 
interests and social concerns, and therefore to the unlikelihood of seeing it significantly impact 
and transform current disciplinary mindset and practice.  
This suggests that the discipline has now entered a new cycle of 
dissidence/marginalization, and it is therefore legitimate to question the extent to which “it is 
extremely unlikely that the study of international relations will quickly relapse into the insularity 
which prevailed before [post-positivism] began to be explored” (Linklater 1992:78)vi. Insofar as 
the problem of values is intrinsic to the problématique of reflexivity, the second part of this 
paper proposes that a reflexive analysis of this problem in IR scholarship should also search for 
possible ways of avoiding the endless repetition of this disciplinary pattern, by redefining both 
the cognitive tenets and social practice underlying IR scholarship’s attitude vis-à-vis the problem 
of values. 
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REFRAMING THE SOLUTION: 
OUTLINE FOR A REFLEXIVIST RESEARCH PROGRAM AND PRACTICE 
 
The epistemic tenets of Reflexivism 
 
The terms of the cognitive debate between “problem-solving” and “critical theory” are 
grounded in the idea that the scholar’s concern for the problem of values is dependent on the 
purpose of theory, and that “problem-solving theory” can avoid the problem altogether because it 
is motivated by a different cognitive and social concern. When Cox (1996[1981]:88; emphasis in 
original) noted that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose,” he explicitly meant 
that no social theory was exempted from this constraint. However, his affirmation that “problem-
solving” and “critical theory” have two “distinct purposes” is not sufficient to undermine 
Positivists’ claim to neutrality and universality. Indeed, this distinction implies that “problem-
solving” theory is the result of individual scholars’ freedom of choice in terms of purpose, and 
that purpose itself can be conceptualized and pursued independently of exogenous social 
constraints.  
Of course, any scholar is perfectly free to define her purpose as she wishes, just as any 
human being is free to defy the “law” of universal gravitation by jumping from a rooftop with no 
flying apparatus. This freedom, which is intrinsic to human behavior, does not in and of itself 
invalidate the “laws” of nature as we understand them. Similarly, the illusion that a scholar can 
simply choose to deny the social embeddedness of her cognitive process does not invalidate the 
factuality of such embeddedness, nor does it neutralize its impact on the processes and outcomes 
of theorizing. Insofar as the demarcation crystallized in the notion of purpose is intimately 
related to the idea that social science can produce a type of explanatory theory that is 
independent of the historicity of thought, and hence of the socio-historical and ideological 
origins and grounding of knowledge, the relevance of purpose as an analytical-turned-social 
demarcation criterion is de facto undermined by the findings of the sociology of knowledge. By 
addressing the “problem of values” itself through a sociological analysis, the first part of this 
paper, then, intended to empirically put to practice the post-positivist claim that cognitive claims 
and concepts are not independent of socio-ideological factors. 
 This also suggests, however, that a truly reflexive cognitive commitment cannot merely 
stop at a stage of deconstruction of past or contemporary cognitive claims, and should go beyond 
this, moving from the results of this deconstruction and taking them as the starting-point for the 
formulation of a significantly different mode of theorizing. In other words, reflexivity should 
lead to Reflexivism, as I use the terms here. Reflexivism is, then, not merely grounded in the 
idea that one can no longer objectivate social reality along the lines defined by the 
correspondence theory of truth. The shifting of the cognitive tenets of Positivism entails not only 
the acknowledgment of the historicity of thought in the form of “social mutability” and 
“historical contingency” (Lapid 1989:243), but also the redefinition of scientific validity, so that 
the investigation of the epistemic validity of knowledge and the investigation of its social 
determination (Mannheim 1936) can be finally reconciled. This requires a move beyond 
“critical” theory understood as a meta-discourse (Cox’s “perspective on perspectives”) so as to 
challenge Positivism on its own turf, and to redefine objectivity within a non-foundationalist 
epistemology. This, in turn, entails a theory of knowledge that can acknowledge and cope with 
the fact that knowledge is always produced out of pre-existing knowledge and that validity 
cannot be determined in the absolute but should be objectivated as a self-corrective, dynamic 
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standard that does not follow a linear logic of cumulation and proof. This epistemic stance is 
important because it alters the way we conceptualize the relationship between the factual and the 
axiological/normative, insofar as it no longer problematizes facts/values within a foundationalist 
theory of correspondence and re-presentation. It consequently also challenges the idea that it is 
only by adhering to the fact/value dichotomy that one can preserve some form of ontological 
realism.  
Reflexivism, therefore, goes beyond reflexivity, i.e., beyond the mere “reflexion on” the 
ways of knowing an object (Holsti), to the objectivation of the ways of knowing and of the 
object as mutually constitutive. It endeavors not merely to extract scholarship from the Positivist 
doctrine of representation, but also to move beyond the “twin fallacies” that have recently been 
framing discussions of epistemology in IR (Kratochwil 2007:2-3): 
 
First, that in the absence of secure universally valid and trans-historically established 
criteria everything becomes “relative” and that, therefore, the adherents of a more critical 
or pragmatic orientation towards knowledge have to be either nihilists or charlatans since 
they deny “truth”. Second, and in a way the flipside of the first fallacy, since the 
foundationalist claims of traditional epistemology can be shown to be faulty, indeed 
“anything goes” and we need not worry about criteria that warrant our knowledge claims. 
 
This entails the development of explanatory models that can ground themselves in history as a 
factor that affects and shapes both the social determination of knowledge and the standards of its 
epistemic validity, thereby establishing some measure of pragmatic objectivity for our standards 
of assessment (Hamati-Ataya forthcoming 2011a). Reflexivism in this sense does not withdraw 
from the realm of theorizing, as if “meta-theory” were an “unproductive distraction from the 
‘real substance’ of the discipline”, but rather establishes itself as a type of meta-theory that is 
both  “the indispensable foundation of competent scholarly activity, and vital for ensuring the 
adequacy of the explanatory accounts which are developed” (Neufeld 1993:54) and a form of 
first-order theory proper (see Pouliot 2007:379 and Hamati-Ataya 2010). 
Reflexivism, thus defined, finds its common roots in different post-positivist approaches, 
such as Critical Theory, some forms of Constructivism, as well as Pragmatism and Critical 
Realismvii. Each of these theoretical orientations has made important contributions that 
undermine the cognitive tenets of Positivism and establish a general outline for reflexive 
scholarship. And although they are often viewed as incommensurable, and divided over their 
ontological/epistemic commitments and the praxeological stances that result from them, they 
share enough in common to be more than just a loose theoretical opposition to Positivism. The 
project of reconstructing their common, underlying Reflexivist framework can of course not be 
carried out within the limits of this paper, but what follows is somewhat guided by the idea that 
we need to “devise new roads to commensurability” (Lapid 1989:248-9) despite the loss of “the 
Archimedean point of indubitable knowledge” (Neufeld 1993:58). My purpose is here restricted 
to showing that Reflexivism can provide us with a different understanding of the question of 
values in both its cognitive and social dimensions. 
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Values from a Reflexivist viewpoint: 
Reversing the premises of Positivism 
 
A reconsideration of the problem of values may find some preliminary guidelines in the 
fact/value dichotomy itself. Given its predominance in the literature, one would expect to find a 
definition of values that explains or justifies the meaningfulness of the dichotomy as an 
ontological a priori, yet interestingly enough, no such definition is available. It is indeed much 
easier to give examples of values than to actually say what values are. There thus seems to be a 
general consensus that freedom, justice, and truth are such examples, but there is no equally 
consensual view of what their common nature is. In fact, as Felix Oppenheim (1973:55) 
remarked, 
 
[t]o speak of “facts” and “values” is misleading – as if facts and values were things and 
could be divided and “allocated” like pieces of pie. The affirmation and the denial of the 
separation between facts and values are theories about the factual and evaluative meaning 
and function of concepts and statements; as such they belong to the philosophy of 
language. (emphasis added). 
 
This may explain why the distinction between facts and values is often embodied in that 
between statements of fact and statements of value or value-judgmentsviii. It also suggests that a 
critical investigation of the dichotomy can be carried out through two different reflexive paths. 
The first one, as Oppenheim notes, is an investigation of social “statements” or utterances as the 
subject-matter of a theory of politics that is informed by a sociology of languageix. The second 
one, which I propose to delineate here, is an investigation of the relationship between knowledge 
and judgment, as the subject-matter of a theory of politics that is informed by a sociology of 
knowledge. The relationship between knowledge and judgment, and by extension between 
knowledge and praxis, constitutes a fundamental epistemic concern for Reflexivism, and has 
been explored, more or less explicitly, by different non-positivist approaches within IR. Despite 
some important differences with respect to their ontological commitments, Constructivism, 
Critical Theory, Pragmatism and Critical Realism share to a large extent a common core that 
considers (1) that knowledge evolves as a self-corrective, dynamic process that does not, 
however, teleologically move toward a predictable end-point; (2) that knowledge and social 
reality are at least partially mutually reflective, and consequently that the reality of the social 
world is better understood in terms of meaning and interpretation (hermeneutics) than 
correspondence and representation; and (3) that the mutual embeddedness of facts and values 
forces us to acknowledge the intimate connections between knowledge-production on the one 
hand, and social determination and social change on the other. A brief reconstructive review of 
these assumptions points to the locus from which to reverse the Positivist terms of the debate 
over the relationship between knowledge and judgment, and hence between the factual and the 
axiological/normative. This locus corresponds to the tension inscribed in a different cognitive 
and existential problématique, namely, not the relationship between what is and what ought to 
be, but between what is and what can be.  
Constructivism’s contribution to this question emanates from its critique of the Positivist 
understanding of “being,” which corresponds to a “reification” of social reality whereby man 
“forget[s] his own authorship of the human world,” and results in man’s illusion that the social 
world is because, and insofar as, it is “something outside of himself” (Berger and Luckmann 
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1991[1966]:106). Assuming, rather, the constitutive role of ideas and beliefs, Constructivism 
adds a question that has become irrelevant for Positivismx: “How is it possible that subjective 
meanings become objective facticities?” (1991[1966]:30). Although most theoretical and 
empirical Constructivist contributions in IR have explored this “becoming” with respect to the 
subjects of social action that are observed by the knowledge-producer (Hopf 1998:184), it has 
recently been expanded more explicitly to the observer herself, notably in the work of Stefano 
Guzzini. Stressing on the need to “take seriously” both “the interpretivist and the sociological 
turns in the social sciences,” Guzzini suggests that a constructivist knowledge of the social world 
must, on the one hand, “analyse [the] relationship” between “the level of common-sense action” 
and the level of “second-order action (or, observation)” (Guzzini 2000:149), and on the other, 
“problematize” the “relationship between the social world and the social construction of meaning 
(including knowledge)”. Moreover, “the relationship between observation and action proper 
needs to be problematized in a ‘reflexive’ way” (Guzzini 2000:150). Such a “reflexivity” places 
the “questions about the relation between meaning/knowledge and power” at the heart of the 
constructivist project, thereby suggesting that “the central issue of power […] is […] not so 
much a question of research taste” as it is one of “theoretical logic” (Guzzini 2000:150). This 
entails, then, a “critical Constructivism” (Hopf 1998) that is more specifically concerned with 
problematizing the relationship between science and politics (and between their respective 
shared values/knowledge) as a doubly reflective manifestation of the relationship between the 
social construction of meaning/knowledge of researchers as/and social actors, and the 
construction of social reality by researchers as/and social actors.  
In a similar fashion, Critical Theory stresses on the dialectical relationship between 
knowledge and praxis, or between thought and history. The question of values is inscribed in the 
relationship of ideology and social interests to the production of knowledge. From a Critical 
perspective, at least some groups’ interests and values manifest themselves in the production of 
allegedly universal visions of the world (and, as Bourdieu would say, simultaneously of its 
divisions). The production of a knowledge of world politics is therefore necessarily grounded in 
material global structures of power, and the (di)visions of the world that are thereby re-presented 
can therefore not be granted the kind of “neutrality” that Positivism posits and aspires to. As the 
realm of knowledge becomes merged with the realm of politics, the fact/value dichotomy that 
serves to isolate cognitive claims from evaluative or ideological ones becomes itself a feature of 
(bourgeois) ideology (Marcuse 2002[1964], Chap. 6). Against the Positivist static view of both 
knowledge and reality, Critical knowledge is hereby viewed as a spiral-like socio-intellectual 
process that is constantly “confront[ing] all its statements on the subjective experience, 
conscious and unconscious, of human beings and human groups, with the objective factors 
determining their existence” (Adorno 1976[1957]:250) – and therefore its own as well. As the 
process actualizes itself by exploring and bringing into existence the “historical alternatives” to 
existing modes of material-cognitive domination, “the values attached to the alternatives do 
become facts when they are translated into reality by historical practice” (Marcuse 
2002[1964]:xlii, emphasis added). 
As “an approach to knowledge that takes its departure from acting rather than from 
reason itself, or from ‘being’ or speculations” (Kratochwil 2007:14, ft.), Pragmatism also 
acknowledges the positive connection between knowledge and judgment/praxis, and therefore 
problematizes both knowing and the known in relation to the practical context of interaction 
wherein reality gains meaning for the observer. Since the “process of knowledge production” is a 
“social practice determined by rules in which scientists are not only constitutive for the 
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definitions of problems” but also constantly re-assess and “debate questions that seem 
‘undecidable’” (Kratochwil 2007:12), the process of knowing is inscribed in an open temporality 
that acknowledges both the historicity of thought and the historicity of judgment. The grounding 
of knowledge/judgment in a reality that exists through the practical significance that it acquires 
for subjects placed in an evolving context of observation/action therefore also allows for a 
problematization of the relationship between science and politics, based on the “insight – on the 
wager – that the temporary isolation of a given value-commitment from the ordinary flow of 
daily life might be the best chance of refining that value-commitment to allow it, and the actors 
who stand by it, to face the open-ended future” (Jackson 2009:659). This implies that as 
knowledge is produced out of evolving and ever-renewed constructions of pragmatic meaning, 
the assessment of what is, can be, or ought to be is altered as contextual knowledge/praxis 
evolves (Hamati-Ataya forthcoming, 2011a).  
The same view of knowledge as a self-corrective, dynamic process characterizes Critical 
Realism, which acknowledges that knowledge of reality “must come about through a 
transformation of pre-existing knowledge,” and that science proceeds “through a constant spiral 
of discovery and understanding, further discovery, and revision, and hopefully more adequate, 
understanding,” without assuming “that the scientific endeavor could ever come to an end” 
(Patomäki and Wight 2000:224). Critical Realism, however, defines itself as a theory of reality 
rather than a theory of knowledge, and it is in its commitment to ontological realism that lies its 
potential for redefining the relationship between what is and what can be. Departing from 
“postpositivism,” which “treats facts as nothing other than disguised values,” Critical Realism 
acknowledges that “reality is differentiated yet interconnected. So, although facts are not merely 
values and vice versa, they are mutually implicating,” which entails for Critical Realism to 
“situat[e] a genuinely critical moment at the heart of analysis; a moment that depends at once 
upon values being factually explained and facts being subject to evaluation.” (Patomäki and 
Wight 2000:234). This ontological principle feeds back into Critical Realism’s anti-positivist 
epistemology, because of the “value” of “truth” itself as a defining standard for knowledge: 
“[f]acts are always value-laden because at the transitive dimension of science truth is a positive 
value and truth as correspondence to the world is a regulative metaphor guiding scientific and 
other practices” (2000:234; emphasis in original). 
 The partial reconstruction of the main tenets of these four approaches to knowledge and 
reality points to three meaningful consequences for the question of values. The first is that the 
very relevance of the distinction between the classical categories of epistemology and ontology 
should be reconsidered, insofar as the ways wherein we view the reality and nature of the social 
world are not independent of the ways wherein we validate our knowledge of them, and vice 
versa. In other words, the epistemological claim that knowledge and reality are mutually 
constitutive is equivalent to the ontological claim that knowledge and reality are mutually 
reflective. This reflects the “looping effect” that is grasped by a reflexive understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge of the world and action in the world, where “knowledge” and 
“action” refer not merely to the subjects that are objectivated by the researcher, but to the 
researcher as a subject as well. The corollary of the collapse of epistemology and ontology is 
therefore the collapse of the subject/object distinction that has provided Positivism with its 
central cognitive and ethical argument. 
 The second consequence is that, insofar as the separation of subject and object can no 
longer be upheld or even viewed as analytically harmless, the relationship between what is (as 
the alleged realm of the object(ive)) and what ought to be (the subject(ive)) should be 
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reconsidered from a new perspective. In the classical terms of the debate, the normative, what 
ought to be, or “ultimate ends” are addressed as static, unchanging principles. However, the 
acknowledgment of the fact that knowledge is itself historical and governed by complex 
processes of correction and redefinitions (concerning its content as well as its standards of 
validity) should also lead to the acknowledgment that the relationship between what is and what 
ought to be (especially their alleged disjunction) can never be constant and set once and for all. If 
our knowledge of the world and of ourselves in it as thinking and acting subjects necessarily 
evolves through our interaction with the world, it should follow that our evaluations of how 
things are, can or should be also evolve in relation to this knowledge, and in relation to our ever-
renewed beliefs and purposes. By stressing on the historical relation between what is and what 
can be, which is grounded in an open temporality that instantly connects the present (as a past 
potentiality) to the potentialities that it can generate, Reflexivism acknowledges that norms are 
constantly conceptualized and assessed in relation to past and present knowledge/context/praxis, 
with also an awareness of what these same norms might mean for us in light of future 
knowledge/context/praxis. This suggests that the question of whether norms can be deduced 
from facts is the wrong question, and that the relationship between “ideals” and “reals” is itself 
inscribed in the historicity of thought and action, and therefore can, and should be investigated in 
a recursive, reflexive manner.  
Such a reflexive approach to norms also transforms the meaning of what Positivism 
views as problematic, namely, that it is not possible to validate norms in the absolute or against 
one another. From a Reflexivist perspective, norms cannot be conceptualized independently of 
the socio-historical context wherein they are both formulated and assessed. If one thinks in these 
terms, the fact/value dichotomy loses its relevance as an ontological a priori, because both items 
of the dichotomy are now subjected to a similar standard of assessment. And just as we cannot 
know today what we will know tomorrow, we similarly understand that we cannot assess which 
values will be preferred in the future. We acknowledge, nonetheless, that the valuable can be 
defined, evaluated and acted upon in relation to a knowledge that is itself self-corrective and 
pursued indefinitely. 
 Finally and consequently, the Reflexivist perspective also forces us to reconsider how the 
relationship between value-freedom as a deontological norm (a manifestation of what ought to 
be) and the fact/value dichotomy as an ontological given (what is) has hitherto been posited by 
Positivism, namely, that the fact/value dichotomy produces the requirement of value-freedom. As 
shown previously, the rationale of this causal logic can be challenged, in the sense that it is 
legitimate to ask whether the practice of value-freedom (and by extension, moral neutrality) is 
rationally deduced from the cognitive assessment of the validity of the fact/value dichotomy, or 
whether it is in fact the socially grounded praxis of value-freedom that has given cognitive 
relevance and meaning to the fact/value dichotomy as a universal ontological a priori. Insofar as 
Reflexivism acknowledges the mutual constitutiveness of meaning/knowledge and praxis, the 
answer to the question is “both,” and the “how” and “why” of this relationship become more 
pertinent than the “what”. The next stage in reversing the culture of Positivism should therefore 
be concerned with revisiting the notion of value-freedom as an ethos for scholarly practice. 
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Reflexivism and the social practice of scholarship: 
Toward a post-Weberian ethos 
 
 A “sociology of reflexivity” in IR, if undertaken, might identify the concern for 
“emancipation” as one of the loci for the emergence of reflexivity as a mode of conceptualizing 
knowledge and its social role. This explains why reflexivity is often viewed as being included in, 
or inclusive of, an emancipatory project for IR scholarship (Hoffman 1987; Neufeld 1993 and 
1995; Linklater 2007). Given that emancipation can be conceptualized in terms of values (at least 
because it is itself defined as something “valuable”), emancipatory reflexive theory necessarily 
challenges the notion that knowledge is divorced from judgment and that scholarship is agnostic 
with respect to political and moral purpose; and it is in its own grounding in values that it 
commits itself to reflexivity as an epistemic necessity (see Horkheimer 1976[1937] and Marcuse 
2002[1964]:xli). Reflexivity can, however, be conceptualized within a sociological approach 
without necessarily being grounded in a pre-defined conception of emancipation, thereby 
allowing the self-corrective nature of knowledge to alter our understanding of the valuable rather 
than imprisoning it in predetermined and rigid normative paths that may become oblivious to 
their own historicity. The purpose of a specifically sociological approach to reflexivity is to 
reveal the ways wherein “the academic studying truth and power is not someone free from the 
effects of power” (Smith 2002:70), by approaching power “in a way which allow[s] […] to view 
socially constructed knowledge as a constitutive factor of social power and which, relatedly, 
make[s] it possible to conceive of the relationship between power and [cognitive] consensus” 
(Guzzini 2000:172). 
 This relationship has been made “invisible” by Positivism’s commitment to the 
correspondence theory of truth understood as a corollary, and a guarantee, of objectivity and its 
corresponding “view from nowhere”. As Smith (2002:83) puts it,  
 
[p]recisely by portraying the discipline as having a core that reflects the world “out 
there,” and precisely by deeming some methods as appropriate (and others as 
inappropriate) to studying that world, international relations, US-style, engages in the 
politics of forgetting its own role in the practices of international relations. 
 
Positivism’s deontology is, then, similar to, and derives from, its epistemology: just as Positivism 
preserves – and thereby reproduces – the reification of social reality by perpetuating the 
“forgetfulness” of its man-made construction, so does it preserve – and thereby reinforces – the 
reification of the valuable by perpetuating the “forgetfulness” of the role of knowledge/praxis in 
reproducing or altering social reality and its underlying normative order. One of the greatest 
paradoxes of the culture of Positivism, then, is that it has made widely acceptable and possible a 
collusion with power while at the same time claiming that scholarship should refrain from 
producing any value-laden judgment on power. The separation of politics/ethics from the realm 
of science has therefore established a practice of moral and social irresponsibility, in the sense of 
non-accountability. The view is that since science is only tangentially or circumstantially 
concerned with values, judgments or norms, it does not fundamentally become polluted, 
involved, or responsible through intercourse with them. 
 Some IR scholars have questioned this Positivist ethos, asserting that “claims of 
neutrality smoke-screen alignments with power structurally, institutionally, and personally” 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2004:36), and therefore that we 
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need to reflect on the possibility that both the ways in which we have constructed theories 
about world politics, and the content of those theories, have supported specific social 
forces and have essentially, if quietly, unquestioningly, and innocently, taken sides on 
major ethical and political questions. (Smith 2004:500; emphasis added) 
 
IR scholarship is therefore more sensitive today to the idea that a reflexive IR must necessarily 
include an investigation of knowledge itself. As Bourdieu has forcefully put it, “the theory of 
knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose 
the principles of the construction of reality… is a major dimension of political power” (quoted in 
Guzzini 2005:520). Consequently, “[m]eta-theories do matter both empirically and politically” 
(Guzzini 2000:156), and ideology need no longer be avoided as a polluting or incriminating 
factor, but should rather be embraced and problematized as intrinsic to the processes (and 
meaning) of knowing (Cox 1996[1985]:56-7). 
 Reflexivism also objectivates reflexivity itself as the product of given socio-historical 
contexts, “September 11” arguably being the latest significant one for IR. Within our 
contemporary setting, Democratic-Peace theorists – who, not accidentally, are themselves 
proponents of value-freedom (Steele 2007:39) – have provided a concrete empirical case study 
for recent reflexive IR scholarship, because the Democratic-Peace thesis was explicitly used by 
the Bush Administration to justify its post-September 11 policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
has led to discussions of “the scholarly responsibility ensuing a theoretical imperative,” which 
can be viewed as analogous, in the realm of the academy, to the “political responsibility ensuing 
a democratic imperative” (Ish-Shalom 2008:680). Piki Ish-Shalom (2008:688) thus points to the 
difference between the properly “moral responsibility” of theorists and their “social 
responsibility”. “Social responsibility” is the “responsibility ascribed to someone well placed to 
identify and remedy a social problem,” which in this case relates to the processes of 
“politicization” and “trivialization” that operate when a theory travels from the realm of the 
academy, where it is legitimate only insofar as it can be subjected to specific standards of 
validity and use, to the realm of politics, where it becomes shaped by the interests and 
performative rhetoric of social agents. While such processes cannot be imputed to theorists 
unless they actually participate in them, scholars can nonetheless not remain oblivious to them or 
to their effects. “Thus, even if theoreticians are not to blame for the Iraq War, they are certainly 
the people most capable of reflecting upon their theory’s politicization and trivialization” (Ish-
Shalom 2008:688) xi. 
 This suggests that IR scholars are invited not merely to “reflect upon” the social and 
moral dimension of their work, but to also make this reflexion a socially useful one, by 
espousing an ethos of social engagement. Wesley Widmaier (2004:443) demonstrates that such 
an “engaged IR” should “involv[e] an ongoing involvement in both scholarly and public 
debates,” which the younger generation of “dissidents” in IR seems less willing to engage in than 
their predecessors (Hamati-Ataya forthcoming 2011b). While this retreat from the public sphere 
is at least partly the result of the general culture of disengagement that characterizes the 
discipline, the absence of some clear roadmap for IR scholars to identify the standards and 
rationale of an engaged ethos is equally to blame. Insofar as “critical,” “normative” and 
“reflexive” IR has expressed its dissatisfaction with the current state of the discipline, its scholars 
are expected to provide the field with alternatives to the Positivist ethos of neutrality. 
Reflexivism, therefore, should make this attempt as well. 
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As suggested earlier in this paper, the treatment of the question of values requires some 
measure of consistency between epistemic/ontological and axiological/normative propositions. A 
Reflexivist deontology should therefore be grounded in a Reflexivist epistemology/ontology. On 
the one hand, Reflexivism acknowledges the historicity of thought/knowledge/theory and 
therefore contextualizes IR scholarship – understood as a field of social production – within the 
general social structures wherein it is inscribed, with a special concern for those that involve 
“power,” however it may be defined. On the other hand, Reflexivism reconciles the realms of 
knowledge, judgment, and praxis, by subjecting them to a unified measure of meaning/validity, 
and by inscribing them in an open temporality that considers these manifestations of human 
behavior as historical potentialities whose meaning/value evolve through time, depending on 
both context and purpose. Consequently, the acknowledgment of the historicity of knowledge 
and thought from a Reflexivist perspective necessarily entails the acknowledgment of the 
historicity of action/praxis as well. Taking the “interpretivist and sociological turns,” then, 
means firstly that the problématique of reflexivity should be inscribed not only in a meta-
theoretical endeavor, but also in a social one that is informed by our knowledge of the social 
processes wherein scholarship is inscribed; and secondly, that these two endeavors – meta-
theoretical and social – should be mutually supportive, since they are, according to Reflexivism, 
mutually constitutive. The Reflexivist ethos, therefore, actualizes itself through two 
interdependent tracks. 
The first track concerns Reflexivism as a field of cognitive production, that is, both the 
production of Reflexivist knowledge and the social organization of such a production. 
Contemporary IR responds to a more or less Positivist approach to knowledge, thought, theory 
and science, wherein disciplines are organized in a way that reproduces the epistemic and 
ontological premises and research agendas of Positivist scholarship, including its definition of its 
subject-matter. Insofar as Reflexivism views IR itself (and knowledge in general) as an integral 
part of the political, a Reflexivist IR curriculum/research program should reflect such a view, by 
including the sociology/history of knowledge as an integral part of IR’s subject-matter. Many 
scholars today are dissatisfied with the rigid institutional and intellectual categories that govern 
their positioning within academia as well as the standards and labels imposed on their scholarly 
research and identity. The recent promotion of inter- or cross-disciplinarity within IR is from this 
perspective not so much a progressive indicator of academic and intellectual development, as it 
is a palliative for the breakdown of the social sciences into isolated social fields of production 
that have lost the memory of their relatedness. From a Reflexivist viewpoint, just as IR meta-
theory is pursued as a form of IR theory proper, IR scholarship that engages the sociology of the 
field (and other social sciences) is not inter-disciplinary as much as it is, properly speaking, 
intra-disciplinary.  
 Within this different curricular and intellectual setting, Reflexivism enjoins us to 
empirically investigate the mutual reflectivity of knowledge and reality, and to produce a type of 
knowledge that is not oblivious to it. In other words, Reflexivism does not aspire to produce an 
eternal or universal discourse on reality, but rather a knowledge that responds to its own 
historicity, embraces the contextuality of its research problems, and dedicates itself to producing 
historical meaning rather than transcendental truths. In the current historical/institutional context 
IR finds itself in, the choice to investigate the field of knowledge is itself a historical choice, 
which responds to the situation (cognitive, political, and moral) that reflexive IR scholars 
currently question or reject. This provides the link to the second track, which is concerned with 
the properly social/moral dimension of Reflexivist scholarship. 
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 Insofar as the Reflexivist perspective acknowledges the historicity of both knowledge and 
judgment/praxis, the Reflexivist ethos cannot produce an essentialist deontology that associates 
scholarship (or science in general) to a specific social or moral value – especially truth, whose 
definition is precisely an object/stake of politics. In other words, the inscription of scholarly 
judgment/praxis in its historical context, and the reflexive awareness that this historicity cannot 
be transcended, preclude the reference to an ideal-type of scholar of the kind Weber envisaged, 
or to any sort of typology for the practicing scholar, whether she restricts her social role to the 
institutional realm of the academy, or decides to engage the wider public sphere. As Reflexivist 
scholarship investigates the relationship between the production of knowledge and the 
production of social order and norms, it provides itself with the means to both better understand 
and better shape its own social praxis. The construction of ideal-typical categories for defining 
such a praxis would be pointless and non-productive, insofar as action can only gain meaning 
within the particular context wherein it is inscribed and which affects its potential outcomes. 
“Dissident” scholarship, in this sense, will be different – and therefore be subjected to different 
standards and requirements – in different socio-political contexts. These need to be identified 
empirically and addressed accordingly.  
The acknowledgment of the plurality of social settings for the practice of scholarship also 
raises important issues and dilemmas that the discipline cannot remain oblivious to. Western 
scholarship assumes the existence of benign social structures that promote or allow the practice 
of a Weberian or Sartrean social engagement – freedom of expression, access to the public, 
protection from physical harm, right to oppose, etc. – that thousands of scholars around the world 
do not enjoy, and for whom acts of resistance may translate into more violent – and, from a 
Western perspective, less “politically correct” or “civilized” – practices. As Alain Badiou 
(2005[1998]) rightly notes, contemporary Western societies themselves have erased from their 
collective memory the violence of their own intellectuals against local or foreign oppressors. At 
another, perhaps more important, level for the discipline as a whole, non-Western scholars who 
engage in a reflexive assessment of IR may become skeptical as to the usefulness of the 
discipline. Insofar as they find themselves, their identities, societies, and perceived interests to 
suffer from the effects of the knowledge-power nexus that reflexive IR is so keen on 
investigating and altering, they may wonder whether any “subaltern” knowledge is worth 
producing at all, if there is no possibility for them to significantly transform the material and 
ideational realities that maintain and reproduce their subjection to Western hegemony – 
including Western cognitive violence. While physical violence may seem to be an extreme act of 
intellectual/political resistance, the refusal to produce a knowledge that may serve to oppress 
one’s people, culture, and future development may just be an equally rational option. Given the 
contemporary hegemonic status of Western (American) IR, reflexive IR scholars who find 
themselves on the higher end of the knowledge-power nexus should be willing to engage these 
issues if they are truly “interested in producing knowledge sensitive to multiple global realities” 
(Tickner and Tsygankov 2008:661), as the 2007 ISA Meeting organizers suggested. 
 The “sociological” turn that is implied in the practice of reflexivity therefore entails an 
understanding of the historicity of the scholarly ethos itself. Informed as it is by an empirical 
study of knowledge as a social field of production, Reflexivism does not merely reject the 
Positivist “view from nowhere”. It rejects, more importantly, the idea that as a social group, 
scholars are both equidistant (in terms of embeddedness and interest) from all other social groups 
and that they themselves constitute some sort of uniformly interested community. There is, 
indeed, no empirical support for the idea that scholarship can be defined by some unique, a 
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priori value or some standard praxeology, and the Weberian ideal-typical approach to scholarly 
deontology, as well as the model of the “public intellectual” à la française, have perhaps served 
to perpetuate this illusion. Weber’s purpose was to define for the academy a place from which it 
could speak critically and independently to power, and for society. Society itself, however, 
cannot be treated as a monolithic entity, or analytically opposed to government and power. And 
neither can science. IR scholars therefore find themselves inscribed in the very processes they 
describe, and their social praxis/ethos should be defined according to this specific locus, which 
unavoidably positions them, and their knowledge, against one another, and against other social 
groups that need to be identified in every given social setting. This particular dilemma therefore 
needs to be investigated and addressed realistically, and Reflexivism offers us the means to do 
so, without imposing the terms or ultimate objectives of scholarly practice. 
Our time and context, then, call for a different ethos than the Weberian one, in light of the 
development of our knowledge, of the world, and of the political dimension of science since 
Weber last contemplated them. If we accept the historicity of our thought and the historicity of 
our praxis as parameters for our scholarship, we should then also reject cognitive and 
praxeological standards of universality and accept to produce a type of knowledge that will not 
go down in history as an eternal truth, but as a historical manifestation of meaningful, 
responsible social action. Such a politicized understanding of scholarship is intrinsic to IR’s 
reflexive – and Reflexivist – project. It may converge with the emancipatory aspirations of some 
post-positivist schools of thought, but it cannot commit itself to a given understanding of 
emancipation – or politics – especially one that does not question its own origins and historicity. 
Just as Positivism has provided a general cognitive framework for the production of various 
theories, paradigms, and research programs that compete for cognitive and praxeological 
meaning, so does Reflexivism provide us with a general cognitive framework for the production 
of a plurality of approaches that investigate the mutual reflectivity of knowledge and reality, and 
that pursue a reflexive social practice. Reflexive scholars are therefore invited to promote socio-
institutional settings, research programs, and social interventions that will allow Reflexivism to 
flourish and explore the many cognitive, social and ethical alternatives that are available for the 
pursuance of a cognitively and socially more relevant and responsible scholarship.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper finds its origins in a commitment to reflexive scholarship, and simultaneously 
in the intuition that the problématique of reflexivity itself originates in an implicit collective 
awareness that something is wrong with the way Western scholarship has hitherto defined its 
position with respect to values. There was, therefore, no better way for engaging (in) reflexivity 
than by looking at the “problem of values” in IR. This “problem,” as I hope to have established 
here, exists as such only for Positivism. Reflexivism, rather, calls for a reframing of the question 
of values as merely an intrinsic dimension of the “problem of knowledge,” which needs to be 
reflexively embraced as a particular, albeit central, object of political theory. 
By showing how specific exogenous factors played an important role in shifting the 
cognitive assessment of the question of values as well as IR scholars’ habitus, this paper not only 
demonstrates the need to reflexively conceptualize and investigate the mutual reflectivity of 
knowledge and reality, but also argues that we can alter our knowledge and social practice in 
light of such a reflexive understanding, thereby inscribing our ethos in a self-corrective 
framework that can cope with the real processes that subtend our scholarship. Reflexivism, 
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therefore, has two important things to offer IR: the inscription of its knowledge-claims in a 
reflexively conscious understanding of how we are produced as knowing and acting social 
subjects, and the inscription of its social practice in an intellectually honest, morally 
empowering, and responsible understanding of the present and the future. 
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i An attempt to test the consistency among the epistemic, ontological, and normative propositions of Realist IR is 
found in Hamati-Ataya (2006). 
ii I do not mean that Smith does not consider the ontological/epistemic dimensions of the problem, rather that the 
logic of his reasoning, which is guided by a properly ethical concern, determines the precedence of the problem of 
value-freedom, and that this precedence determines the sequence in which the other questions are posed.  
iii This criterion is based on the idea that the means whereby knowledge is validated can be made independent of the 
logic of discovery itself, and therefore that methodological value-control can guarantee a certain measure of 
objectivity. For a critique of this view, see Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1983[1968]). 
iv Most Behavioralists adopted a positivist/scientist approach, grounded in the subject/object distinction, where 
objective knowledge derives exclusively from the qualities of the object, regardless of those of the subject. 
v I am grateful to Professor Theodor Hanf for this important detail. 
vi A review of two leading IR journals – International Organization (IO) (Vol. 56-64) and International Security (IS) 
(Vol. 26-35) since “September 11” points to the marginal status of reflexive IR and its research and social concerns. 
Some exceptions are worth noting in IS, such as Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02), Singer (2001/02), Jentleson 
(2002), and Desch (2007/08) and in IO, Acharya (2004), Ruhs and Chang (2004), Barnett and Duvall (2005), and 
Barnett (2009). Nonetheless, and except for Williams (2004), these contributions are not properly “reflexive” (they 
may address ideas, norms, and ethics as objects of study, but their analyses are not fundamentally committed to 
theory as constitutive of world politics) in comparison to what appears in journals like International Studies Review, 
Review of International Studies, Millennium, or even International Studies Quarterly (see bibliography). 
vii See also the English School (Dunne, 1998), and Normative Theory (Frost, 1986; Cochrane, 1999). 
viii A typical example of this shift is illustrated in the following, “Preliminary Definition”: “But what is meant by fact 
and what is meant by value? It is important in this area to start with a simple definition that can help us in the 
discussion. A classic factual statement is “It is raining outside”” (Stedman-Jones, 1998: 49-50, emphasis added). 
ix It finds its roots in the debate between R.M. Hare and John R. Searle, and was recently explored by post-positivist 
IR under the influence of the works of (the later) Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Habermas. E.g., Fierke (2002). 
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x Early sociological Positivism (Comte, Marx, Durkheim) viewed social institutions as both factual and normative 
realities, which crystallized, at any given time, the singular institutionalization of historical practices, and the 
normative order shaping their reproduction. From this perspective, Positivism was the critical thought of an era.  
xi This process is common to both physical and social scientists, and should therefore not be easily disregarded by 
Positivist scholars who view the pure sciences as their deontological role-model. 
